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BLENDED ENTERPRISE AND THE DUAL MISSION
DILEMMA
Dana Brakman Reiser*t
INTRODUCTION
This symposium is an incredibly exciting event, coming as it does, less
than three years after Vermont's introduction of the L3C concept and in the
middle of so many attempts by individual entrepreneurs, social innovators,
legislators, and regulators to get a handle on somehow blending the goals of
profit and public good. Indeed, I have now said many times that the
boundary between charity and business has become a moving target. I see
nonprofits engaged in commercial activity, social enterprises of various
descriptions, and philanthropy divisions of for-profit companies as all of a
piece. They all attempt to use business models and practices to pursue
charitable objectives. Combining profit-making and pursuit of social goods
comes in many forms and by many names. I try to aggregate the general
sense of dual motivation under the tag of "blended enterprise."
To define my terms, when I speak of blended enterprise, I mean an
entity that intends to pursue profits and social good both in tandem and by
making considered choices to pursue one over the other. Blended
enterprises at times will pursue more profits over more social good, and at
times will pursue more social good over more profit. A single blended
enterprise may do both in different situations. Of course, if the pursuit of
profits and social good always aligned and more profits always followed
social good and vice versa, the single mission charity or business forms
would suffice to house blended enterprises. This perfect alignment, though,
is far from realistic. Thus, achieving and governing truly blended enterprise
means consistently serving two masters, which is notoriously difficult. This
essay will review and compare how traditional charity and business forms,
as well as several of the emerging hybrid forms, attempt to structure and
solve this dual mission dilemma, and will offer some thoughts on how to
improve them.

* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.
t I greatly appreciate the support of Brooklyn Law School's summer research stipend
program, the extraordinary research assistance of Sparkle Alexander, and the comments and suggestions
of the panelists and participants at the Vermont Law School Symposium "Corporate Creativity: The
Vermont L3C and Other Developments in Social Entrepreneurship." Any remaining errors are, of
course, my own.
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I. THE TRADITIONAL ALTERNATIVES
Until recently, the law has compelled those who desire a blended
enterprise to adopt either a charity or a business form of governance. Once
formed, an entity's leaders must attempt to use a single mission form to
govern their blended enterprise. Yet, neither the traditional charity form-a
nonprofit corporation-nor any of the traditional business forms-either
incorporated or unincorporated-is particularly well-suited to doing so.
Charitable forms are inhospitable because although the law certainly
permits charities to earn profits, it bars charities from distributing those
profits.' Entrepreneurs wishing to blend equity finance and social goals
must look elsewhere. Additionally, charitable forms' limited funding
streams-from donations, debt-financing, and earned revenue-are
precisely what have turned the interest of many social entrepreneurs to
blended enterprise.
Likewise, standard business forms align imperfectly with the goals of
blended enterprise, due mainly to legal and practical problems incident to
their owners' control. Business organization law generally expects
managers of businesses to act to maximize profits for their owners despite
occasional exceptions permitting incidental consideration of other
constituencies' interests. 2 Of course, there are times when this expectation
is undercut or relaxed, such as in corporate law's permission of corporate
charitable contributions or the existence of other-constituency statutes.
Even in these contexts, however, business managers are permitted to pursue
goals in conflict with, or other than, profit-maximization as a sideline rather
than as an equally important and parallel goal of the enterprise. In addition
to legal limits, the market creates serious practical pressure for business
managers to maximize profits, rather than pursue social objectives. Failing
to do so may result in business reverses and loss of market share,
undermine investor-confidence, and perhaps cause managers to lose their

1. Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise,89 YALE L.J. 835, 838 (1980).
2. See Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing CorporateProfits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV.
733, 736 (2005) ("Unless modified by statute, traditional fiduciary duties require corporate managers to
further the interests of shareholders, and thus require them to maximize corporate profits subject to the
obligation to comply with independent legal constraints.") (citation omitted).
3. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 78.138(4) (LexisNexis 2004) ("Directors and officers,
in exercising their respective powers with a view to the interests of the corporation, may consider ... (c)
The interests of the community and of society...."); N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 717(b) (McKinney
2010); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1715 (West 2010).
4. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 78.138(1), (4) (LexisNexis 2004) (stating that "Directors and
officers shall exercise their powers in good faith and with a view to the interests of the corporation ... ," and
that they "may consider .. .the interests of the community and of society .... ") (emphasis added).
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positions. Some, but not all, of this market pressure is blunted for
unincorporated and/or privately funded entities.
In addition, founders of business entities may employ various
techniques to establish and attempt to enforce blended mission. Dual-class
stock ownership can be used to prevent inroads by groups hostile to a
blended mission and to maintain control with founders faithful to it. Google
Inc. has this structure, and it is one element of why the "for-profit
philanthropy model" might be effective there.s Google has committed to
using one percent of its equity and profits for philanthropy, but pursues
those goals through a philanthropy division of its for-profit corporation.6
This for-profit philanthropy model, however, is not really a form of blended
enterprise as I define it here. Google makes only a small scale commitment
to pursue social goals in relation to its profit-making/taking pursuits.
Google's investors might be willing to take this small cut in profits on an
otherwise attractive investment for a range of reasons. They may predict
they will still make substantial gains over other investment alternatives.
They may believe (as does Google) that this expenditure will enhance the
brand and therefore profits in other pursuits. They may view Google.org as
essentially a savvy technique for engaging in highly speculative, but
potentially lucrative, investments outside the company's traditional sphere.
It remains to be seen whether the for-profit philanthropy model can be
widely replicated; it may be a unique strategy available only to this unique
company.
Other business forms also offer mechanisms for enforcing blended
mission. For example, closely held corporations can write shareholder
agreements committing their signatories to blended mission and include
limitations on transfer of ownership rights.8 Likewise, in the partnership or
LLC forms, at least as a default, ownership transfers may be made subject
to severe limitations.9 Still, no business form can sufficiently protect
blended mission-at least not without undermining access to capital. The

5. David Haskell, For-ProfitPhilanthropy,N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2006, § 6.
6. See What is Google.org?, GOOGLE.ORG, http://www.google.org/about.html (last visited
Nov. 1, 2010) (noting that Google.org was formed as a charitable division of Google).
7. Dana Brakman Reiser, For-ProfitPhilanthropy,77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2437,2470 (2009).
8. See Harwell Wells, The Rise of the Close Corporationandthe Making of CorporationLaw,
5 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 263, 275 (2008) (recognizing that since close corporations are often formed by
individuals who want to work together, they typically "seek restrictions on transfer of stock so they can
control who they have to work with") (citation omitted).
9. See UNIF. P'SHIP ACT §§ 502-503 (1997) (permitting transfer of partners' rights to profits
and losses, but not of governance rights without consent of other partners); UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT
§§ 502(a), (f) (2006) (permitting transfer of member's economic rights but not rights in management and
permitting enforcement of limits on transfer).
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appetites and desires of owners, even founding owners, can shift. Over
time, if a set of owners come to favor profits over social goals, business
organization law will not work to constrain them from obtaining their
preferences.
II. NEW HYBRID FORMS OF ORGANIZATION

Legislation and private innovation now offer hybrid forms of
organization in an attempt to solve the evident mismatch of blended
enterprise with either charity or business forms. These new hybrids are an
important first step, but the journey is far from over. I believe these nascent
forms do not yet sufficiently solve the dual-mission dilemma inherent in
blended enterprise.
A. The Low-Profit Limited Liability Company (L3C)
In the pages of the Vermont Law Review, it seems apropos to begin
with a discussion of the low-profit limited liability company.' 0 The
Vermont Legislature pioneered the form, which at this writing seven other
U.S. states and two Native American tribes have adopted by substantially
similar legislation." L3Cs work on a limited liability company (LLC)
framework, but there are some important tweaks. The L3C must be formed
for educational or charitable purposes, though significant profit-making
activities will not, on their own, undermine meeting this requirement.12
This structure signals acceptance and endorsement of blended
missions. There must be an educational or charitable purpose of an L3C,13
but there also may be significant profit-making activities;14 it is envisioned
that those profits can be distributed to some or all of the L3C's members.
10. In April 2008, Vermont became the first state to adopt legislation creating the low-profit
limited liability company form. See Robert Lang, What is the L3C?: Basic Explanation, AMS. FOR
CMTY. DEV., http://www.americansforcommunitydevelopment.org/downloads/WhatisTheL3C.pdf (last
visited Nov. 1, 2010); Low-Profit Limited Liability Company, VT. SEC'Y OF STATE,
http://www.sec.state.vt.us/corps/dobiz/llc/lc_13c.htin (last visited Nov. 1, 2010).
11. Laws, AMS. FOR CMTY. DEv., http//www.americansfomommunitydevelopment.org/laws.php
(last visited Nov. 16, 2010) (listing Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, North Carolina, Utah, Wyoming, the
Crow Indian Nation of Montana, and the Oglala Sioux Nation as additional jurisdictions that have adopted L3C
legislation).
12. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §3001(27)(A)-(B) (1997 & Supp. 2009) (defining a L3C
company as a company which "significantly furthers the accomplishment of one or more charitable or
educational purposes" and "the fact that a person produces significant income or capital appreciation
shall not, in the absence of other factors, be conclusive evidence of a significant purpose involving the
production of income").
13. E.g., id. §3001(27)(A).
14. E.g., id. §3001(27)(B).
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This structure clearly and unequivocally distinguishes itself from a
traditional charity, as there is no nondistribution constraint. Indeed, and
importantly to my mind, if at some point profits do eclipse social goals, the
L3C will simply transform into an LLC with no need for regulatory
involvement, indeed with seemingly no other change.' 5
The L3C adopts the LLC governance framework with virtually no
changes.' 6 This framework is one marked by extreme flexibility. LLCs, and
by extension L3Cs, can adopt one of two default governance alternatives: a
member-managed model or a manager-managed model.' 7 In addition, an
L3C may extensively vary whichever model it chooses under an operating
agreement.' 8 Presumably, an L3C could impose an obligation on its
managers to pursue both profit and social good in such an agreement. What
happens, though, if internal consensus on the wisdom of blended mission
breaks down? How will these obligations be enforced when there is no
regulator and transformation to an LLC is both easy and costless?
Whoever undertakes the management role in an L3C is subject to
fiduciary obligations of care and loyalty extending to the L3C and its
members.' 9 However, fiduciaries are permitted to act in their own selfinterest, so long as they do not compete with the L3C, act as an adversary,
or breach obligations of good faith and fair dealing. 20 The original Uniform
Limited Liability Company Act provides an example of an LLC member
who votes against a proposal that the LLC open a shopping mall in
competition with the member's own shopping mall.2 1 Likewise, would a
member or manager of an L3C be permitted to act in her own interest and
vote to move to a predominantly profit-pursuing model? Perhaps it would
breach the duty of good faith if the member or manager were to do so, if
this duty were interpreted to require fidelity to the blended mission
concept.22 But this outcome is far from clear today. The fact that an L3C
may transform immediately and without penalty into an LLC 23 also
suggests such a vote would not be problematic.
15. E.g., id. §3001(27)(D) ("If a company. . . ceases to satisfy the [L3C requirements], it shall
immediately cease to be a low-profit limited liability company, but . .. will continue to exist as a limited
liability company.").
16. VT. SEC'Y OF STATE, supra note 10.
17. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT §407 (2006).
18. See id. § 110 (discussing the scope, function, and limitations of an operating agreement).
19. Id. § 409(a)-(c), (g).
20. Id. § 409(d).
21. Id. §409 cmt. (1996 version).
22. For a thorough discussion of fiduciary duties within the L3C context, see John Tyler,
Negating the Legal Problem of Having "Two Masters": A Frameworkfor L3C Fiduciary Duties and
Accountability, 35 VT. L. REv. 117 (2010) (published in this book).
23. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §3001(27)(D) (2009).
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Some who offer financing ideas for the L3C suggest using various
classes or tranches of L3C members to solve this governance quandary.24
An L3C may allocate members' different levels of investment and
governance rights--different from each other and different from other
members.2 5 Perhaps it would be possible to allocate control to a member or
group of members with the proper incentives to enforce blended mission.
Who would that group be?
For example, consider the three-tranche L3C structure commonly
suggested. In the equity tranche, private foundations making programrelated investments (PRIs) are statutorily proscribed from investing with a
predominant profit motive.26 These private foundations may be offered
residual profits, but little or no midstream profits, and their financial
interests will be junior to all other creditors and members. These
foundations will, however, be endowed with dominant rights in governing
the organization. As the foundations' interest in profits would be either
remote or nonexistent, they could perhaps be counted on to prevent a move
towards a single-minded profit orientation. In addition, the IRS's interest in
policing PRIs could offer a form of shadow regulation. But, this placement
of sole or dominant governance interests in the hands of a private
foundation, which seemingly is interested in investing for little return, is
unlikely to protect blended mission. At best, it would protect social mission.
Another possibility would be to place predominant governance rights
and the responsibility of guarding blended mission with a class of L3C
members whose own interests are blended-perhaps foundation investors
interested in some return (though lower than market) combined with social
good. Alternatively, this role could be allocated to a broader class of
investors seeking a socially responsible investment-individual investors or
non-foundation institutions. These investors could be provided some belowmarket level return, which accompanied with the psychic returns, would
entice them to invest. I hypothesize this is a more likely position for
foundations than being interested solely in offering a donation to an entity
24. Robert M. Lang Jr., Community Foundations & the L 3 C, AMS. FOR CMTY. DEv. (2008),
http://www.americansforcommunitydevelopment.org/downloads/CommunityFoundationsAndL3C.pdf;
Jim Witkin, The L3C: A More Creative Capitalism,TRIPLE PUNDIT (Jan. 15, 2009), http://www.triplepu
ndit.com/2009/01/the-13c-a-more-creative-capitalism/.
25. See UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 407 & cmt. (2006) (providing default rules of equal
participation but noting that these may be changed by the operating agreement) (referring to language in
IRC § 170(cX2)(B)).
26. See I.R.C. §4944(c) (West 2009) (defining PRIs as "investments, the primary purpose of
which is to accomplish ['religious, charitable, scientific, literary . .. educational, {and a few other
similar} purposes'], and no significant purpose of which is the production of income or the appreciation
of property").
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that will ultimately make profits for its other investors to the exclusion of
them. In addition, one or a small group of sophisticated foundations would
have a much greater capacity to play this enforcement role than a diffuse
class of socially responsible investors.
Still, there are serious problems with the L3C solving the dual mission
dilemma using either of these techniques. First and foremost, none of this is
mandatory-the hallmark of the L3C is its flexibility. While an L3C form
would allow its adopters to use either technique, they need not undertake
any mechanism to enforce blended mission. Second, there is no clear
regulatory backstop for this governance regime. Perhaps the IRS would act
as a shadow regulator, though it is unclear whether the IRS would be
equipped to enforce blended mission or would be interested in doing so.
Although far from certain, challenges against an L3C fiduciary's
obligations could entail some duty to maintain or enforce blended
mission. Third, I am skeptical that if an L3C allocates complete or
dominant control to foundations or socially-responsible investors, it would
be able to successfully market memberships to others seeking market-rate
returns without offering significant security to those investors. Furthermore,
if substantial security is available to attract these investors, wouldn't
forming as a charity or business and selling true debt to these investors be
easier and more appropriate?
Establishing some method for enforcing blended mission, either by fiat
through imposition of specialized fiduciary obligations, or structurally by
requiring governance rights to be sited with some appropriatelyincentivized group, would improve the L3C's claim to a position as a home
for blended enterprise. This claim would be further enhanced if some
limited regulatory role were envisioned to back it up. However, either of
these attempts to resolve the dual mission dilemma may ultimately
undermine the L3C's ability to increase the capital available to pursue
social goals.28
B. The Community Interest Company (CIC)
A similar lesson can be gleaned from the very different experience of
the United Kingdom's community interest company. The CIC operates on a
company framework and can be limited by shares. This structure envisions
27. See Tyler, supra note 22, at 156 (postulating that traditional fiduciary duty enforcement
mechanisms-including derivate suits, fraud claims, ultra vires acts, and veil piercing-could be used to
ensure that an L3C entity remains faithful to its stated charitable purpose).
28. For a more detailed discussion of this tradeoff, see Dana Brakman Reiser, Governing and
FinancingBlended Enterprise,85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 619 (2010).
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a quasi-equity investor entitled to dividends. 29 These investors are only
quasi-equity investors for two important reasons. First, the CIC is an asset
locked entity; it may distribute its assets on dissolution only to a charity or
another CIC, keeping them in the community benefit stream.30 Second,
there are various strict limits on midstream profit distributions to
shareholders. 3 ' Due to recent changes in regulation, the limits differ
depending on when the shares were issued. Shares issued before April 6,
2010 may not yield dividends greater than five percent over the Bank of
England base lending rate,32 which is currently set at half a percent. For
shares issued after April 6, 2010, "[t]he share dividend cap shall be 20
percent of the paid up value of a share in a relevant company."3 4 Also, the
total annual dividend declared for all shares may not exceed thirty-five
percent of distributable profits,3 s and dividend capacity may be carried over
for only a limited number of years. 36 Profit-taking is envisioned, but the
extent of such profit-taking is limited.
In addition, a CIC must pursue social goals that a reasonable person
would see as benefitting the community. This requirement casts a
substantially larger net than would the U.K. definition of charity, but clearly
envisions an entity with some serious social goals. All of these significant
obligations are overseen by a dedicated, "light touch"38 Regulator.39 Again,

29. The CIC was created in 2004 by amendments to the U.K. company law. Companies (Audit,
Investigations and Community Enterprise) Act, 2004, Explanatory Note 8 (2004), available at
http://legistation.data.gov.uk/ukpga/2004/27/notes/data.pdf.
30. Id c. 27 § 30 (U.K.) (establishing a cap on community interest companies' distributions
and interest); see also THE REGULATOR OF COMMUNITY INTEREST COMPANIES, INFORMATION AND

GUIDANCE NOTES § 6.1 (U.K., 2009), available at http://www.cicregulator.gov.uk/guidanceindex.shtml
(describing the asset lock provisions on dividends); id. § 10.5 (reiterating that the asset lock applies at
dissolution as well).
31. See Companies Act, 2004, c. 27 § 30 (U.K.) ("Community interest companies must not
distribute assets to their members unless regulations make provision authorizing them to do so.").
32.

THE REGULATOR OF COMMUNITY INTEREST COMPANIES, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 11

(2009) [hereinafter FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS], availableat http//www.cicregulator.gov.uk/CICleaflets
/FAQ%20-%200ctober%202009%20V5.00%2Final.pdf.
33. BANK OF ENGLAND, http://www.bankofengland.co.uk (last visited Nov. 1, 2010).
(AUDIT,

34. THE REGULATOR OF COMMUNITY INTEREST COMPANIES, NOTICES UNDER THE COMPANIES
INVESTIGATIONS AND COMMUNITY ENTERPRISE) ACT 2004 1 (2009), available at

http://www.cicregulator.gov.uk/Notices-%20Dividend%20&%201nterest%2OCap%20v01.pdf.
35.

FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, supra note 32, at 11.

36. Id.
37. Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community Enterprise) Act, 2004, c. 27
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, supranote 32, at 8.
COMMUNITY
Us,
THE
REGULATOR
OF
38. About
http://www.cicregulator.gov.uk/aboutUs.shtm] (last visited Nov. 1, 2010).

39. Companies Act, 2004, c. 27 § 27.

INTEREST

§ 35(2);

COMPANIES,
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we see a hybridization of significant social goals and private profit-taking,
distinguishing the CIC from single mission charity or business forms.
As noted, CIC governance operates on the model of a company. In a
CIC limited by shares, the shareholders will elect directors, will be owed
fiduciary duties, and may (though to a considerably narrower extent than in
the United States) be able to pursue remedies derivatively. 40 Additionally,
regulations require CICs to provide a role for non-shareholder stakeholders
in governance, 4 1 and report to the Regulator annually on their efforts to do
SO.42

The combination of company law and additional CIC content
establishes governance techniques addressed to enforcing blended mission.
The community benefit requirement and asset lock require a CIC to precommit to social goals and irretrievably dedicate a substantial part of its
assets to their pursuit. All the while, however, dividends to shareholders are
specifically contemplated. Nonetheless, shareholders are not the sole
relevant constituency to a CIC's leaders, as other stakeholders must be
involved in (or at least informed about) governance. Moreover, CIC
shareholders may be particularly likely to use their clout to enforce blended
mission. CIC investors are a group with truly blended goals, having voted
with their dollars by investing them in an entity offering limited potential
investment gains, but potentially offsetting social gains. In addition, the
CIC form envisions a public backstop for enforcement of blended mission.
The dedicated Regulator supervises registration and annual reporting, and is
authorized to "investigate complaints" and "act if it is found that a CIC is
not working in the interest of the community or that the profit/asset lock is
not being observed."4 3 The Regulator's broad authority includes the power
to change the makeup of a CIC's board or terminate the CIC altogether."
In a CIC, the community benefit requirement, asset lock, and dividend
caps all structurally enforce a commitment to social goals. Internal
constituencies and external regulation are empowered to police. Perhaps CIC
shareholders (if they can be found in large numbers) will be committed to
enforcing dual mission. The external regulator, though it seems to emphasize
enforcing social goals, as would an empowered donor-type private foundation

40. As fiduciaries of the company, directors must exercise their management and supervisory
duties with "reasonable care, skill and diligence" and avoid conflicts of interest or other situations of
potential disloyalty. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, §§ 170-177 (U.K.).
41. INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE NoTEs, supra note 30, at §9.2.
42. FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, supra note 32, at 17.

43. Id. at 12.
44. Id
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entity tranche in an L3C. Maybe the idea in both instances is that the market
will be sufficient motivation to pursue profits? Perhaps.
Another problem is that although the CIC offers a range of potentially
effective tools to enforce social mission, the same fear regarding fleeing
capital raised with regard to the L3C appears to have come to pass in the
CIC. The CIC form has struggled to find acceptance among founders, who
perceive that they, in turn, will have trouble obtaining capital.45 Perhaps the
elusive blended mission investor crowd is too small, or maybe it is just the
current financial climate-time will tell. But, the CIC may be evidence that
a statute can go too far in enforcing blended mission (or at least one half of
it) to the detriment of the original goal of getting more funding for social
purposes.46
C. The B Corporation
The final organizational form I want to touch on brings us back to the
traditional business forms-the "B Corporation." The "B" or "for-benefit"
designation is available for a variety of business organizational forms. For
brevity's sake, I will simplify and address only the B Corporation here.
The B Corporation uses the standard state law-defined, for-profit
corporation as a model, but tweaks the model to pursue a more blended
mission.
For example, the private, nonprofit B Lab offers to license its "B"
trademark to companies who meet various requirements showing they
"use[] the power of business to solve social and environmental problems."48
45. The CIC Regulator recently sought input on whether the dividend caps have impeded the
CIC's ability to attract investments and should be changed. See THE REGULATOR OF COMMUNITY
INTEREST COMPANIES, CONSULTATION ON THE DIVIDEND AND INTEREST CAPS 3 (Mar. 30, 2009),

available at http://www.cicregulator.gov.uk/%27Caps%27%2OConsultation%20V00.01SO.pdf.
The
responses that the Regulator received demonstrated frustration with the dividend caps. Financiers
reported that the caps "unduly limit[] incentive to those that might make an equity investment" and nonCIC social enterprises suggested that the caps did affect their decision not to organize as a CIC. THE
REGULATOR OF COMMUNITY INTEREST COMPANIES, SUMMARY OF THE RESPONSES TO THE
CONSULTATION ON THE DIVIDEND AND INTEREST CAPS 5-6 (Oct. 2009), available at

http://www.cicregulator.gov.uk/Surmnary/*20of%/ 20Responses%20V00.01 SO.pdf. The Regulator
responded by changing the dividend cap to "20 percent of the paid up value of a share" for shares issued
after April 6,2010. NOTICES UNDER THE COMPANIES ACT, supra note 34.
46. Brakman Reiser, supranote 28, at 649, 651-52, 654.
47. B Lab offers similar tools for entities formed as sole proprietorships, limited liability
companies, and general, limited, or limited liability partnerships.
48. B LAB, INTRODUCING THE B CORPORATION 3 (2009), availableathttp/www.bcorpotion.net/
resources/bcorp/documents/2009%20B%2OCorp_IntroPackage.pdf
In mid-April 2010, Maryland became the first state to adopt a statutory "benefit
corporation" modeled on B Lab's concept. See Diane Mastrull, MarylandAdopts New Socially Aware
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A B Corporation must incorporate or reincorporate in a state with a socalled "other constituency" statute, which permits corporate directors to
consider non-shareholder interests in making their decisions. 49 The
corporation must also go further and amend its bylaws to require directors
to take into account such interests, including broad social and
environmental concerns.50 These new obligations, though, are enforceable
only through the typical for-profit corporate mechanism of suits by
shareholders or through a B Lab audit, which may revoke the right to
license and use the B trademark."
The B Corporation offers weaker structural enforcement of blended
mission than the CIC. It incorporates a requirement to pursue social goals
into fiduciary mandates, but only shareholders can enforce these mandates.
The same shareholders could be bought off by offering them part of the
uncapped and unlocked profits that pursuing only profit might generate. In
this context, B Lab serves as an external private regulator, but is faced with
a difficult challenge: B Lab must find a way to become a serious enforcer of
blended mission. B Lab must establish "B" as a powerful mark for
consumers, investors, and business partners, but certification must not
become so onerous that it loses its attraction for founders of blended
enterprises. Without enough certified B Corporations, no one will know or
CorporationLaw, PHILA. INQ., Apr. 15, 2010, at COI. The new law did not take effect until October
2010, and the contours and enforcement regime, if any, for this new form have not yet become clear.
Consideration of its merits, as distinct from the privately-certified B Corporation, will be addressed in
future work.
49. See About B Corp., B LAB, http://www.bcorporation.net/about (last visited Nov. 1, 2010)
(noting that to become a B Corporation, an entity must amend its "corporate governing documents to
incorporate the interests of employees, community and the environment").
50. For example, a B Corporation in New York must amend its articles of incorporation to
include the following language:
In discharging his or her duties, and in determining what is in the best interests of
the Company and its shareholders, a Director shall consider such factors as the
Director deems relevant, including, but not limited to, the long-term prospects and
interests of the Company and its shareholders, and the social, economic, legal, or
other effects of any action on the current and retired employees, the suppliers and
customers of the Company or its subsidiaries, and the communities and society in
which the Company or its subsidiaries operate, (collectively, with the
shareholders, the "Stakeholders"), together with the short-term, as well as longterm, interests of its shareholders and the effect of the Company's operations (and
its subsidiaries' operations) on the environment and the economy of the state, the
region and the nation.
Legal Roadmap, B LAB, http://survey.bcorporation.net/becomellegal2.php (last visited Nov. 1, 2010) (to
access this quoted language select "C Corporation" under "Corporate Structure" and "NY" under "State
of Incorporation") (emphasis added).
51. Auats, B LAB, http-//www.bcorporation.net/indexcfiLfuseaction/content.page/nodelD/62c0al776625-4373-9142-01e788e468cd (last visited Nov. 1, 2010). Although the audit process exists, it is relatively new.
At this writing, B Lab had only completed the first two years' audits and all certified entities passed. Id
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care about the B Corporation trademark. We will need to wait and see
whether B Lab becomes an active and effective regulator.
III. CONCLUSION
The ultimate question must be "how can we effectively enforce a dual
mission?" Unfortunately, the law has not yet provided a definitive answer.
At the moment, the L3C does not require any form of blended mission
enforcement. New adopters of the L3C form should experiment with
incorporating mechanisms into law and practice regulating L3C
governance. The CIC seems to enforce social goals quite rigorously, but not
blended mission, and it will choke off interest by profit-motivated investors
if it goes too far. The Regulator has undertaken review of the form and
made a few midstream corrections. This effort is laudable and should be
continually monitored. Perhaps tinkering with the dividend or asset lock
restrictions or other components of the form will reveal the way to enforce
blended mission and reach the elusive market of blended mission investors.
I am skeptical as to whether the B Corporation's changes to fiduciary
obligation will sufficiently enforce blended mission, whether achieved
through private certification or new state corporate forms drawing on B
Lab's for-benefit concept. From this experiment, we will learn much about
the viability of a certification model in this area. B Lab must thread the
needle between being a strict enough enforcer and certifying enough entities
to create the network effects needed for the B trademark to become a viable
brand.
We are at the beginning of an exciting journey, and these attempts
should be applauded. At the moment, experimentation with hybrid forms is
rife, and hopefully it will lead to a winnowing of forms. In order for an
effective hybrid form to emerge, however, its crafters will have to create a
governance solution to the dual mission dilemma.

